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CUSTIS v. UNITED STATES: ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
BEING USED TO INCREASE PRISON TERMS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Custis v. United States/ the Supreme Court held that 
persons convicted in federal court whose sentences were en-
hanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (hereinafter 
"ACCA"),2 may not collaterally attack3 the constitutionality of 
their prior convictions.4 The ACCA increases the penalty for 
possession of a firearm by a felon from a maximum ten year 
sentence to a mandatory fifteen year minimum sentence when 
the person convicted has three prior convictions for violent 
felonies or serious drug offenses.6 The Court noted that a con-
viction obtained when the defendant was without counsel may 
1. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J., 
in which O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsberg, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., joined). 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). The ACCA provides for a mandatory fifteen year 
minimum sentence for certain firearm violations when the person convicted has 
three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. See infra note 
44 in which the statutory language is reproduced. 
3. The term "collateral attack" is used to describe "an attempt to avoid, de-
feat or evade [a judgment] or deny its force and effect in some incidental proceed-
ing not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it .... " BLACK's 
LAw DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990). See also Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739 n.l 
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.). "The Court's opinion 
makes clear that it uses the phrase "collateral attack" to refer to an attack during 
sentencing." Id. 
4. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. The one exception to this rule allows "convic-
tions obtained in violation of the right to counsel" to be collaterally challenged. Id. 
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988). See infra note 44, in which the statutory 
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be collaterally challenged,6 but held that the ACCA precluded 
challenges to the constitutionality of prior convictions on other 
grounds.7 
Consequently, the Court did not consider the alleged con-
stitutional defects in Custis' prior convictions8 and allowed 
them to be used to increase his sentence from a ten year maxi-
mum9 to 235 months in prison.10 If the Court had permitted 
Custis to challenge any of his prior convictions, and if he was 
successful in doing so, he would have lacked the three prior 
convictions necessary for sentence enhancement under the 
ACCA. 
This note will first explain the facts of Custis' case and 
then discuss the background of the ACCA. The ACCA discus-
sion will be followed by a review of the procedural history and 
the Supreme Court's analysis of Custis' case. The note will 
then offer a critique of the Court's interpretation of the lan-
guage and legislative intent behind the ACCA. Finally, the 
note will conclude that the Custis decision illustrates increas-
ing judicial effort to curtail the availability of post-conviction 
relief formerly available to criminal defendants. 
II. FACTS 
Darren J. Custis was arrested in Baltimore, Maryland on 
July 1, 1991 and indicted for possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute;l1 possession of a firearm in connection with drug 
trafficking;12 and possession of a firearm by a convicted fel-
on.13 Custis was convicted in United States District Court on 
the latter firearm charge and of the lesser included offense of 
cocaine possession.14 
6. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 1739. 
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (1988). 
10. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735. 
11. United States v. Custis, 786 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D. Md. 1992); see 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) (1988). 
12. Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
13. Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l) (1988). 
14. Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535. 
2
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Custis was previously convicted of robbery in Pennsylvania 
state court in 1985,15 of burglary in Maryland state court in 
1985,16 and of attempted burglary in Maryland state court in 
1989.17 These prior convictions constituted the three "danger-
ous felonies"lS necessary for sentence enhancement under the 
ACCA, and the government moved to use them to increase 
Custis' sentence for his firearm possession conviction. 19 
Custis asserted that inadequate assistance of counsel ren-
dered two of his prior convictions unconstitutional, and that 
unconstitutional convictions should not be used to increase the 
sentence imposed for a subsequent conviction.20 Specifically, 
Custis alleged that his guilty plea to the 1985 burglary charge 
was on the advice of counsel and was not knowing and intelli-
gent,21 as required by Boykin v. Alabama.22 Custis' counsel 
allegedly failed to advise him regarding the defense of volun-
tary intoxication; a defense Custis claimed he would have 
raised had he been made aware of its existence.23 The tran-
15. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (1994). 
16. See W. 
17. See w. 
18. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1988) defines violent felonies for purposes of sen· 
tence enhancement under the ACCA as: 
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceed-
ing one year, ... that - (i) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extor-
tion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another. 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1988). 
19. Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535. 
20. [d. at 534. 
21. [d. 
22. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Boykin case is widely cited 
to illustrate the requirement that a defendant be fully informed of the ramifica-
tions of a plea of guilty before the court may accept that plea. 
Mr. Boykin pleaded guilty to five counts of robbery and was sentenced to 
death. [d. at 239-40. The trial judge accepted his plea without questioning and 
without informing him of its consequences. [d. at 239. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the trial judge's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea without 
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary was plain error. [d. 
at 242. The Court required defendants be made aware of the seriousness of a 
guilty plea because it "supplies both evidence and verdict, ending [thel controver-
sy." [d. at 242-43 n.4 (quoting Woodard v. State, 171 So. 2d 462, 469 (Ala. Ct. 
App. 1965». 
23. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. 
3
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script of Custis' guilty plea, which he provided for the district 
court, affirmatively demonstrated that his lawyer did not ad-
vise him of any possible defenses, and that he was "confused" 
during the guilty plea proceeding.24 
Custis challenged his 1989 attempted burglary conviction 
on the ground that it resulted from a "stipulated facts" trial. 25 
He asserted that a trial on stipulated facts was essentially 
equivalent to a guilty plea, and was unfair because he was not 
adequately advised of his rights and did not enter a knowing 
and voluntary plea.26 Custis further alleged that the stipulat-
ed facts established only attempted breaking and entering, not 
attempted burglary.27 He therefore reasoned that his convic-
tion for attempted burglary was the result of ineffective assis-
tance of counseI,28 
The district court refused to consider Custis' allegations of 
constitutional violations in his prior convictions,29 and the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.30 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Fourth Circuit 
opinion conflicted with the decisions of several other cir-
cuits.31 The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision32 dis-
24. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) 
(No. 93-5209). Petitioner's brief included the following excerpt from the Maryland 
state court transcript: 
1d. at 4 n.2. 
THE COURT: Has [your lawyer) told you in the past the 
pssible [sic) defense you might have in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: She has not told you what defenses you 
might have had or that you didn't have any? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Has she discussed the case with you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, somewhat but it's been confus-
ing. 
THE COURT: What's been confusing? 
THE DEFENDANT: The whole thing really has been 
confusing. 
25. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. 
26. See id. 
27. 1d. 
28.1d. 
29. 1d. at 1735. See Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535-36. 
30. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735. See United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 
1357 (4th Cir. 1993). 
31. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735. At least eight other circuits had recently al-
4
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missing Custis' challenges to his prior convictions.33 
As a result of the application of ACCA sentence enhance-
ment provisions, Mr. Custis was sentenced to nearly twenty 
years in prison without possibility of parole.34 Absent his prior 
convictions, his sentence would have been approximately three 
years.35 
III. BACKGROUND OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL 
ACT 
The Armed Career Criminal Act was originally enacted as 
part of section 1202(a) of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereinafter "OCC Act").36 
The OCC Act provided that a convicted felon who possesses, 
receives, or transports a firearm in interstate commerce may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for up to two years, fined up to 
$10,000, or both.37 The Act further provided that a convicted 
felon who possesses, receives, or transports a firearm in inter-
state commerce and who has three prior convictions for rob-
bery, burglary, or both,38 must receive a sentence of at least 
lowed defendants to challenge prior convictions on constitutional grounds other 
than absence of counsel. The First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have allowed challenges based on an involuntary and unknowing guilty 
plea. See, e.g., United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 974-79 (lOth Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Paleo, 967 F.2d 7, 11-13 (lst Cir. 1992); United States v. Day, 
949 F.2d 973, 981·84 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ruo, 943 F.2d 1274, 1275-
77 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir. 
1990); and United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1989). Further, 
the Third and Ninth Circuits have allowed challenges based on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 87-89 (3d 
Cir. 1990); and United States v. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1987). 
See also Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735 n.1. 
32. See United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993). 
33. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. 
34. See id. at 1735. 
35. See Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.4, Custis (No. 93-5209). Attorneys for peti-
tioner cite the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, as pre-
scribing a sentence ranging from thirty-three to forty-one months; approximately 
three years. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines manual, § 
4B1.4{a) (Nov. 1990). See generally David Cole, Criminals Called Out Before Fin· 
ishing Their Chance at Bat, CONN. LAw TRIBUNE, March 28, 1994, at 18. 
36. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202{a) (Supp. III 1985) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-308 
§ 104{b), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (l00 Stat.) 459) (recodified with amendments at 18 
U.S.C. § 922{g) (1988». 
37. Id. 
38. See id. The underlying convictions necessary to trigger the ACCA were 
5
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fifteen years imprisonment and be fined up to $25,000.39 Per-
sons convicted under the DCC Act were ineligible for suspend-
ed sentences, probation or parole.40 The portion of the OCC 
Act providing for increased sentences for convicted felons with 
the prior designated convictions was termed the Armed Career 
Criminal Act of 1984.41 
On November 15, 1986, Congress repealed § 1202(a)42 but 
recodified it into §§ 922(g)43 and 924(e)(1)44 of Title 18 of the 
subsequently changed from "robbery, burglary, or both" to "three previous convic· 
tions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense." [d. See also 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(1) (1988). 
39. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (Supp. III 1985) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-308, 
§ 104(b), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 459) (recodified with amendments at 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988». 
40. See id. 
41. [d. at § 1201. 
42. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 459. 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) prohibits convicted felons from possessing fire-
arms and reads as follows: 
[d. 
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; 
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any con-
trolled substance . . . ; 
(4) who has been a<ijudicated as a mental defective or 
who has been committed to a mental institution; 
(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the 
United States; 
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces un-
der dishonorable conditions; or 
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has 
renounced his citizenship; 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammuni-
tion; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which pas 
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce. 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988) states: 
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this 
title and has three previous convictions by any court 
referred to in section 922 (g)(l) of this title for a violent 
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on 
occasions different from one another, such person shall be 
fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant 
a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to 
6
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United States Code. Despite minor modifications to the lan-
guage of the code,45 the relocation was effectively a reenact-
ment of the statute.46 
The ACCA prohibits courts from granting suspended sen-
tences or probation to persons convicted under § 922(g). Per-
sons convicted under § 922(g) are not eligible for parole with 
respect to the sentence imposed under the ACCA.47 While the 
ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of fifteen years impris-
onment,48 it does not specify a maximum penalty.49 Further-
more, because the ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute 
and does not define substantive offenses,5o the prosecution is 
not required to prove the defendant's prior convictions beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 51 Therefore, if a defendant is convicted 
under the ACCA statute, the court may impose a lifetime pris-
on term52 without possibility of parole, simply by showing 
[d. 
the conviction under section 922(g), and such person shall 
not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence 
imposed under this subsection. 
45. See supra note 38. 
46. See H.R. No. 99-495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1, 23, 26, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1352. 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988). 
48. [d. 
49. See id. 
50. See United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1377 (7th Cir. 1988) (The Lowe 
court stated that § 924 contains a sufficient number of common indicia of a sen-
tence enhancement provision to establish Congress' intent to create one.). See gen· 
erally Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhance-
ment Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (1988) (concluding that 
Congress intended the ACCA to be a mechanism for sentence enhancement and 
not a substantive offense). 
51. See United States V. West, 826 F.2d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1987); see also 
Buckley V. Butler, 825 F.2d 895, 903 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1738 
(1988) (due process does not require that sentencing factors be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence). 
52. See United States V. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir. 1993). Defendant 
Brame was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was subject 
to sentence enhancement under the ACCA. [d. Brame contended that since the 
ACCA specified only a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years and did not 
specify an express maximum sentence, the maximum sentence should be some 
term in excess of fifteen years but less than life imprisonment. [d. at 1428. The 
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and adopted the position of the other circuits that ad-
dressed the issue, holding that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life 
imprisonment. [d. (citing Walberg V. United States, 763 F.2d 143, 148-49 (2d Cir. 
1985) (penalty statute that fails to provide explicit maximum period of imprison-
ment implicitly authorizes imposition of a maximum sentence of life». 
7
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that the requisite prior convictions occurred. These sentences 
stand in sharp contrast to those that would be imposed absent 
a sentence enhancement provision.53 Mr. Custis' sentence, for 
example, was increased by approximately sixteen years be-
cause of his prior convictions. 54 
Sentence enhancement legislation has been enacted in 
various forms by most states in this country.55 The general 
purpose of such laws is to deter repeat offenders; a group be-
lieved to be responsible for the majority of violent crimes in the 
United States.56 Anti-recidivism legislation has been unsuc-
cessfully challenged on multiple constitutional grounds57 and 
has repeatedly been upheld by the Supreme Court.68 The pro-
hibition on collateral attacks to prior convictions announced in 
Custis will have widespread impact if it is applied to defen-
dants convicted under the myriad other anti-recidivism stat-
utes currently in place in the United States.59 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Bronaugh, 895 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1990) (defen-
dant was convicted of making a false statement to acquire a firearm and his sen-
tence was increased five-fold under the ACCA). 
54. See Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, United States v. Custis, 114 S. Ct. 1732 
(1994) (No. 93-5209). 
55. See, e.g., 1994 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 12 (Deering) (California's recently 
enacted "three strikes" law). See generally Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing 
Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARv. L. REV. 511 (1982) (stating 
that as of 1979, recidivist statutes were in force in 44 states, the District of Co-
lumbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and at the federal level). 
56. See H.R. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661-63. 
57. See, e.g., United States V. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(mandatory sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(2) does not violate due process 
merely by divesting court of sentencing discretion); United States V. Gilliard, 847 
F.2d 21, 25-27 (1st Cir. 1988) (fifteen year mandatory sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 
924 does not violate eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment since statute focuses on violent crimes and seeks to remove guns from 
the possession of violent criminals); United States V. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 
(8th Cir. 1989) (use of prior state court armed robbery convictions to enhance 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924 was not double jeopardy since conviction in state 
court and conviction under § 924 resulted from charges brought by separate sover-
eigns for separate incidents). 
58. See, e.g., Rummel V. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980); Spencer V. Texas, 
385 U.S. 554, 559 (1967); Oyler V. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1962). 
59. See generally Cole, supra note 35. 
8
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IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Maryland District Court initially reviewed Custis' 
attacks on his prior convictions in a letter ruling.60 The court 
rejected Custis' assertion that his 1989 "stipulated facts" trial 
for attempted burglary was the functional equivalent of a 
guilty plea.61 However, the court concluded that in Custis' 
1985 burglary conviction, counsel's failure to discuss possible 
defenses with the defendant could constitute performance be-
low the applicable standards of professional competence.62 
The court deferred ruling on the matter, intending to hear 
testimony at the sentencing hearing,63 but subsequently re-
versed its position and held that the Armed Career Criminal 
Act "provides no statutory right to challenge prior convictions 
relied on by the government for enhancement."64 That deter-
mination was based on the court's reading of the ACCA as pro-
hibiting collateral challenges to prior convictions unless the 
defendant was without counse1.65 Since Custis asserted that 
his prior convictions were rendered unconstitutional by ineffec-
tive counsel,66 rather than by absence of counsel, the district 
court deemed those convictions not reviewable in that fo-
rum.67 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court opinion.68 The Fourth Circuit was concerned 
with the "substantial burden" imposed on prosecutors and 
district courts by a requirement that they conduct "fact-inten-
60. United States v. Custis, No. S 91·0334 (D. Md. filed Feb. 27, 1992). 
61. See id. at 2-3. 
62. See id. at 1. See also, Brief for Petitioner at 6, Custis v. United States, 
114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (No. 93-5209). 
63. See Custis, No. S 91-0334 at 2. 
64. Custis v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 533, 535-36 (D. Md. 1992). 
65. [d. at 536-37. The district court could not locate binding precedent from 
the Fourth Circuit which addressed a defendant's right to collaterally attack prior 
convictions on grounds other than absence of counsel. [d. It acknowledged that 
other circuits had allowed such challenges but stated that a defendant's right to 
such a challenge was of uncertain origin. 1d. The court concluded that, to the 
extent those cases extended the right to collateral challenges to include cases not 
involving absence of counsel, those decisions were unsound. [d. 
66. [d. at 534. 
67. 1d. at 537. 
68. United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1993). 
9
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sive" inquiries into state court records that are likely to be 
inadequate or unavailable.69 The court also expressed concern 
over issues of federalism70 and comity,71 stating that "federal 
courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials."72 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari73 because the 
Fourth Circuit opinion conflicted with the decisions of Courts 
of Appeals in several other circuits, which allowed defendants 
to challenge the constitutional validity of prior convictions used 
in sentencing under the ACCA. 74 Grounds for collateral attack 
in other circuits included ineffective assistance of counsel,75 
and an unknowing or involuntary guilty plea.76 
V. SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
1. The Language of the ACCA 
The majority77 began its analysis by interpreting the rele-
vant language of the Armed Career Criminal Act.78 The 
ACCA provides for an increased sentence for any person who 
possesses a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),9 and 
69. Id. at 1361 (quoting United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 
1992». 
70. Federalism: "Term which includes interrelationships among the states and 
the relationship between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990). 
71. Comity: "The principle in accordance with which the courts of one state or 
jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a 
matter of obligation but out of deference and respect." BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY 
267 (6th ed. 1990). 
72. Custis, 988 F.2d at 1361 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 
(1983». 
73. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 299 (1994). 
74. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (1994). 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 87-89 (3d Cir. 1990); Unit-
ed States v. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1987). 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 978 (10th Cir. 1993); Unit-
ed States v. Paleo, 967 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Ruo, 943 F.2d 
1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 642-43 
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1989). 
77. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J., 
in which O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsberg, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., joined). 
78. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (1994). 
79. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) reads in relevant part: 
10
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who has "three previous convictions by any court referred to in 
§ 922(g)(1) for a violent felony or a serious drug offense."80 
The majority believed that Congress' use of the phrase "three 
previous convictions," indicated its intent to allow sentences to 
be increased based on the "fact of conviction" alone.s1 The ma-
jority concluded that the statute's failure to expressly provide a 
means of challenging such convictions suggested that Congress 
did not wish collateral attacks to be available.s2 
Custis argued that even absent express statutory authori-
zation, defendants have an implied right under § 924(e) to 
challenge the constitutionality of prior convictions.s3 The 
Court rejected that argument, citing a portion of the Gun Con-
trol Act of 1968,84 of which the ACCA is a part, as illustrative 
of legislative intent: "Any conviction which has been expunged, 
or set aside, or for which a person has been pardoned or has 
had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction 
for purposes of this chapter.,,85 The Court concluded that the 
express statutory mention of convictions which were 'set aside' 
created the negative implication that all convictions that had 
not been set aside may be used to increase sentences under the 
ACCA.88 
In support of its conclusion, the Court pointed to other 
statutes enacted by Congress which contain sentence enhance-
ment provisions and which expressly allow repeat offenders to 
challenge prior convictions.s7 The existence of statutes which 
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person -
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any fire-
arm or ammunition . . .. 
See supra, note 43, wherein the statutory language is reproduced. 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988). 
81. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1736. 
82.Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). 
85. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(20». 
86. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1736 (emphasis added). 
87. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 851(c) as an example). Section 851(c) is a part of 
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allow such challenges at the time of sentencing convinced the 
Court that Congress was capable of incorporating similar pro-
visions into the ACCA, had it desired to do so. ss The Court 
viewed the absence of such language in the ACCA as indicative 
of a conscious legislative intent to prohibit collateral attacks on 
prior convictions.s9 
2. Ineffective Counsel versus Absence of Counsel 
Custis argued that regardless of whether the ACCA per-
mitted attacks to prior convictions, the Constitution required 
that they be allowed.90 Custis cited Burgett v. Texas91 and 
United States v. Tucker92 to support his right to challenge 
constitutionally infirm predicate convictions.93 In Burgett the 
defendant was charged with assault with intent to murder.94 
The prosecution offered evidence of prior felony convictions 
which, if proved, would have rendered the defendant subject to 
life imprisonment for the current offense.95 The trial judge ac-
knowledged that one of the prior state court convictions had 
been obtained without the defendant having legal counsel,96 
and the court instructed the jury to disregard testimony relat-
(1) If the person denies any allegation of the information 
of prior conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged 
is invalid, he shall .file a written response to the informa-
tion .... 
(2) A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the 
information was obtained in violation of the Constitution 
of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the 
factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to 
the information . . . . 
21 U.S.C. § 861(c) (1988). 
88. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1736. 
89. Id. 
90. See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1994). 
91. 389 U.S. 109 (1967) (introduction of constitutionally infirm prior conviction 
was inherently prejudicial; use of such a conviction to enhance punishment for 
another offense would allow an unconstitutional procedure to injure a defendant 
twice). 
92. 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (affirmed appellate court decision remanding case for 
reconsideration of defendant's sentence because district court considered unconstitu-
tional prior convictions when determining that sentence). 
93. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1737. 
94. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 110. 
96. Id. at 111. 
96. Id. at 112. 
12
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ed to that prior unconstitutional conviction.97 The defendant 
was subsequently convicted of the assault charge9S but the 
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding 
that evidence of an unconstitutional prior conviction is inher-
ently prejudicial, and instructions to disregard such testimony 
do not adequately protect the defendant.99 
In Tucker, the defendant was convicted of armed rob-
bery.loo The trial judge explicitly considered the defendant's 
prior felony convictions when imposing the maximum sentence 
of twenty-five years. 101 Two of the defendant's prior felony 
convictions were later determined to have been obtained with-
out counsel,102 rendering them constitutionally invalid. 103 
The case was, therefore, remanded for resentencing. l04 
The Court distinguished both Burgett and Tucker from 
Custis' case, however, stating that the finding of unconstitu-
tionality in both of the earlier cases was limited to violations 
based on the holding in Gideon v. Wainwright. l05 Gideon held 
that indigent defendants in state court proceedings were enti-
tled to state-appointed counsel and the lack thereof rendered 
any resulting conviction unconstitutional. l06 The Court held 
that a complete absence of counsel is a "unique constitutional 
defect" and thus has much greater significance than a claim of 
inadequate counsel. l07 By interpreting Burgett and Tucker as 
relevant only in absence of counsel cases, the Court precluded 
97. 1d. at 112. 
98. 1d. at 110. 
99. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115-16. 
100. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 443-44 (1972). 
10l. 1d. at 444. 
102. 1d. at 444-45. The Superior Court of Alameda County, California held in a 
collateral proceeding that defendant's 1938 burglary conviction in Florida and his 
1946 burglary conviction in Louisiana were obtained without defendant having the 
assistance of counsel. See In re Tucker, 409 P.2d 921 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1966). 
103. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 444-45. 
104. 1d. at 446. 
105. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1737-38 (1994); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
106. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-40 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 
(1942), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent defen-
dants was not applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause without a show-
ing of special circumstances). 
107. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738. 
13
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their application to Custis' case. 
The Court cited Johnson v. ZerbstlO8 to support its con-
clusion that convictions obtained without counsel for defendant 
are unique, and not applicable to Custis' case.109 The Court 
held in Johnson that failure to appoint counsel not only violat-
ed the Sixth Amendment,110 but gave the defendant the right 
to collaterally attack his conviction via federal habeas corpus 
review. lll Prior to the Johnson decision, habeas review was 
available to collaterally attack a conviction only when the 
forum court lacked jurisdiction.112 The Court effectively decid-
ed in Johnson that absence of counsel rose to the level of a 
jurisdictional defect, and that a "conviction pronounced by a 
court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereun-
der may obtain release by habeas corpus.,,113 
The Court explained that its decisions, beginning with 
Johnson over fifty years ago, and extending through the more 
recent Burgett and Tucker opinions, illustrated that a convic-
tion obtained when the defendant was without counsel is un-
constitutional by virtue of a jurisdictional defect.114 The Court 
believed that those cases illustrated that absence of counsel 
cases have historically been viewed differently than cases 
flawed by other constitutional violations. ll5 The Court found 
no such historical evidence of unique treatment for convictions 
that resulted from ineffective assistance of counselor an unin-
formed guilty plea, and concluded that they did not Buffer from 
ld. 
108. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
109. Custis, 114 s. ct. at 1738. 
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial ju-
ry . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process in obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
111. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1737 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. 458). 
112. ld. (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 88 (1923». 
113. [d. at 1737 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468) (quotation omitted). 
114. ld. at 1738. 
115. See id. 
14
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the same jurisdictional flaw. 116 Accordingly, it held that con-
victions marred by constitutional flaws other than absence of 
counsel are not subject to collateral attack during sentencing 
under the ACCA. ll7 
The Court cited ease of administration as additional justi-
fication for the distinction drawn between ineffective counsel 
and absence of counsel. 118 While the absence of counsel would 
be evident from the judgment roll,119 an attorney's effective-
ness or the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea is not 
readily determinable and may require examination of tran-
scripts from the prior trials.120 The Court expressed reluc-
tance at requiring sentencing courts to examine state court 
transcripts that may be difficult to obtain or nonexistent.121 
The Court further supported its conclusion by expressing 
its concern with the finality of judgments. 122 Quoting its prior 
opinion in United States v. Addonizio,123 the Court cautioned 
that "[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine 
confidence in the integrity of our procedures."124 The Court 
was particularly concerned with the finality of judgments in 
cases in which the defendant pleaded guilty, as Custis did to 
the charges leading to his prior convictions.125 The Court was 
reluctant to create new avenues through which to attack con-
victions obtained by guilty pleas because the vast majority of 
criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas.126 
116. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738. 
117. See id. 
118. 1d. at 1738-39. 
119. 1d. at 1738. 
120. 1d. 
121. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738-39. 
122. 1d. at 1739. 
123. 442 U.S. 178 (1979). Addonizio, former Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, was 
convicted of conspiracy and sixty-three separate counts of extortion while in office. 
1d. at 180 n.2. When modifications in the policies of the United States Parole 
Commission resulted in Addonizio serving a longer sentence than that anticipated 
by the sentencing judge, Addonizio appealed, asserting that his sentence was con-
trary to the judge's intent. 1d. at 180-82. The Supreme Court denied his right to 
collaterally attack his sentence, citing as partial justification for its holding, its 
concern with the finality of judgments. 1d. at 184-87. 
124. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739 (quoting Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184 n.11) (alter-
ation in original) (quotation omitted). 
125. 1d. 
126. See id. at 1739; see also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 
15
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3. Availability of Habeas Review 
The Court recognized that a defendant who is "in custo-
dy"127 for prior convictions during sentencing under the 
ACCA, is free to challenge the prior convictions directly in the 
jurisdiction in which he was convicted or through federal habe-
as review. 128 Once a sentence has expired, however, the de-
fendant is no longer in custody for that conviction and habeas 
review is unavailable.129 The possibility that a defendant's 
prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentence imposed 
for a subsequent conviction does not renew his status as "in 
custody" for the prior conviction. 130 
The Court stated that because Custis was still in custody 
for his prior convictions at the time of his sentencing under the 
ACCA,13l he was free to seek habeas review of those earlier 
convictions.132 The Court also stated that if Custis successful-
ly attacked the constitutionality of any of the prior convictions, 
he could apply to have his sentence under the ACCA reopened.133 
(1979). 
127. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989). Maleng defined "in custody" to 
include the period of time before a sentence is fully expired, even though the 
prisoner has been released from physical confinement. ld. at 491-92. A prisoner 
released on parole is thus viewed as remaining in custody for purposes of habeas 
review. ld. 
128. CustiS, 114 S. Ct. at 1739; see also Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490-91 (referring 
to 21 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) to define the relevant circumstances under which a court 
may grant a writ of habeas corpus: (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend 
to a prisoner unless-(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States . . . .). 
129. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (holding that once a prisoner's sentence has 
completely expired, the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance 
the sentence for a subsequent conviction is not sufficient to render an individual 
"in custody"). 
130. See id. 
131. Neither the Supreme Court opinion (Custis, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994» nor the 
opinions below (Custis, 786 F. Supp 533 (1992), Custis, 988 F.2d 1355 (1993» 
explain why Custis remained "in custody" at the time of his sentencing. The Su-
preme Court opinion stated that Custis may directly attack his state court convic-
tions "in Maryland." Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739. As Custis was not physically im-
prisoned for prior convictions at the time of his ACCA sentencing, it can be in-
ferred that he was on parole for one of the prior convictions in Maryland. This 
would account for his status as "in custody" at the time of his ACCA sentencing. 
132. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739. 
133. ld. 
16
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4. Summary of Majority's Holding 
To summarize, the majority concluded that the ACCA as 
written does not expressly provide a defendant with the right 
to collaterally attack a prior conviction used to enhance the 
sentence imposed under that statute.134 The Court recognized 
that convictions obtained without the defendant having legal 
counsel suffer from a constitutional flaw that has historically 
been regarded as unique, and that those convictions rise to the 
level of a jurisdictional defect.135 Accordingly, those convic-
tions should not be used to enhance the sentence imposed for a 
subsequent conviction, and may be collaterally attacked. 136 
However, convictions which are alleged to be unconstitutional 
by virtue of inadequate assistance of counselor an uninformed 
guilty plea are not flawed to the same degree as convictions 
marred by absence of counsel.137 The Court, therefore, rea-
soned that those convictions must be attacked directly in the 
rendering forum or through federal habeas corpus review. 136 
Because Custis' allegations of constitutional error were based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel and an uninformed guilty 
plea, the Court held that they were not subject to review in the 
federal sentencing forum. 139 The Court acknowledged that be-
cause Custis was in custody for his prior felony convictions at 
the time of his sentencing under the ACCA, habeas review re-
mained available to him.140 
B. DISSENTING OPINION 
1. Conflicting Decisions From Other Circuits 
The dissene4l began by noting that with the single ex-
ception of the Fourth Circuit holding below/42 United States 
134. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (1994). 
135. [d. at 1736-38. 
136. [d. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. at 1739. 
139. Custis, 114 S. Ct at 1739. 
140. [d. 
141. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1739 (1994) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, J.J.). 
142. See United States v. Custis, 786 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1992). 
17
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Courts of Appeals had consistently interpreted the ACCA as 
allowing sentence enhancement based on prior "lawful" convic-
tions, and have allowed defendants to demonstrate at sentenc-
ing that prior convictions were unlawfully obtained.143 Consti-
tutional challenges to prior convictions have been based on 
absence of counsel, which the majority concurs is permissible, 
but also on ineffective assistance of counsel,l44 and an un-
knowing or involuntary guilty plea;145 the same constitutional 
infirmities Custis claimed.146 
The dissent observed that despite the numerous appellate 
decisions which allowed collateral challenges to convictions 
which were rendered unconstitutional by flaws other than 
absence of counsel, Congress has not amended the ACCA to 
expressly prohibit such challenges.147 The dissent pointed out 
that Congress has amended the language of § 924 several 
times148 but left the relevant portion of the ACCA un-
changed.149 The dissent reasoned that Congress' failure to ex-
press legislative disagreement with the appellate holdings 
cited above was a clear indication of approval.150 Thus, the 
dissent concluded that Congress must have intended to allow 
challenges for constitutional flaws other than absence of coun-
sel. 151 The dissent found support for its conclusion in Herman 
& MacLean v. Huddleston,152 in which the Court said, "[i]n 
light of [a] well established judicial interpretation [of a statuto-
ry provision], Congress' decision to leave [the provision] intact 
suggests that Congress ratified the interpretation."153 
143. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct 1732, 1739-40 (1994). 
144. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 87-89 (3d Cir. 1990); Unit-
ed States V. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1987). 
145. See, e.g., United States V. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 978 (10th Cir. 1993); Unit-
ed States V. Paleo, 967 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1992); United States V. Ruo, 943 F.2d 
1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1991); United States V. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 
1990); United States V. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1989). 
146. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. 
147. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1740-41. 
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1988) (listing amendments following the text of the 
code). 
149. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1740. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983). 
153. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1741 (quoting Herman & MacLean V. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983» (alteration in original> (quotation omitted). 
18
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2. Misreading of Burgett and Tucker Cases 
The dissent criticized the majority's interpretation of the 
Burgett1M and Tucker166 opinions as overly narrow. 156 The 
majority concluded that the right recognized in those cases to 
collaterally attack prior sentences was limited to the right to 
have counsel present. 167 The dissent asserted that Burgett 
and Tucker were better read as embodying the broader princi-
ple that a sentence may not be enhanced by a conviction the 
defendant can show was obtained in violation of any constitu-
tional right.158 The dissent found support for its interpreta-
tion of Burgett and Tucker in appellate opinions that "consis-
tently read [Burgett and Tucker] as requiring courts to enter-
tain claims that prior convictions relied on for enhancement 
were unconstitutional for reasons other than Gideon viola-
tions."159 Two of the cases the dissent cited involved the same 
constitutional errors that Custis alleged were present in his 
prior convictions: unknowing or involuntary guilty plea (United 
States v. Martinez)160 and ineffective assistance of counsel 
(Brown v. United States).161 
In Brown, the defendant was convicted of interstate trans-
portation of forged securities.162 He alleged that his sentence 
was improperly enhanced because of prior unconstitutional 
state court convictions.16s Defendant averred that the guilty 
154. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). 
155. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). 
156. See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1743-44 (1994). 
157. [d. at 1738. 
158. See id. 
159. [d. at 1740 & n.3 (citing the following cases, which allowed collateral at-
tack for reasons other than absence of counsel: United States v. Mancusi, 442 F.2d 
561 (2d Cir. 1971) (confrontation clause); Jefferson v. United States, 488 F.2d 391, 
393 (5th Cir. 1974) (self-incrimination); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 
(7th Cir. 1969) (unknowing and involuntary guilty plea); Taylor v. United States, 
472 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1973) (self-incrimination); Brown v. United 
States, 610 F.2d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1980) (ineffective assistance of counsel); 
Martinez v. United States, 464 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1972) (self·incrimination». 
160. See United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969) (unknowing 
and involuntary guilty plea). 
161. See Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1980) (ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel). 
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plea in one of those convictions resulted from police threats 
and coercion and that his attorney improperly disregarded 
those circumstances.164 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the 
. potential ineffective counsel issue and remanded the case for 
reconsideration of the defendant's sentence,165 stating that "it 
is clear that the right to the assistance of counsel and the right 
to effective assistance of counsel are constitutional equiva-
lents."l66 
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of an unknowing 
or involuntary guilty plea in Martinez. 167 Martinez was con-
victed of a narcotics violation and his sentence was increased 
because of a prior narcotics conviction.16s Defendant alleged 
that his guilty plea in the previous conviction was unin-
formed. 169 Based on the defendant's potentially uninformed 
guilty plea, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court 
opinion denying Martinez the right to challenge his prior con-
viction, and remanded the case to determine the validity of the 
prior conviction.170 The court rejected the argument that the 
validity of the prior conviction would be difficult to determine, 
stating that "[i]f the district court has the power to strike in-
valid prior convictions, it is only fundamental that the same 
court with its inherent fact finding power and incidental power 
to conduct hearings can determine which prior convictions are 
invalid."l7l 
The dissent further supported its contention that the 
Burgett and Tucker holdings were not intended to be limited to 
absence of counsel cases by quoting text from both opinions: "a 
sentence may not be founded [even] in part upon misinforma-
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 677. 
166. Brown, 610 F.2d at 675. 
167. United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969). 
168. Id. at 61-62. 
169. See id. at 62-63. Martinez was a Spanish·speaking citizen who required the 
assistance of an interpreter. Id. at 62. He alleged that his interpreter spoke Span· 
ish very poorly and as a result, Martinez was unclear about the law and was not 
adequately advised of his right to a jury trial. Id. Martinez further alleged that he 
pleaded guilty solely because he was undergoing withdrawal symptoms and was 
promised treatment for his drug problem if he pleaded guilty. Id. 
170. Id. at 64. 
171. Id. 
20
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tion of constitutional magnitude,172 because to do so would be 
to allow the underlying right to be denied anew and to suffer 
serious erosion."173 The dissent explained that the Burgett 
and Tucker courts referred to Gideon 174 because the right to 
be represented by counsel, as established in Gideon, was the 
specific right at issue in those cases.175 The Burgett and 
Tucker courts' discussions of Gideon were not intended to limit 
permissible collateral attacks to the specific constitutional 
violation suffered by Mr. Gideon, but were intended to be "il-
lustrative of the limitations the Constitution places on state 
criminal procedures."176 
Moreover, the dissent saw no adequate justification for the 
distinction the majority drew between absence of counsel, a 
flaw which can be collaterally attacked, and ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, which cannot be collaterally attacked.177 The 
dissent asserted that the Sixth Amendment's178 guarantee of 
assistance of counsel is not a mere formality, and compliance is 
not ensured simply by having an attorney present at trial, 
because "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel.,,179 The dissent further argued that a convic-
tion marred by an uninformed or involuntary guilty plea mer-
its no more consideration for purposes of sentence enhance-
ment than do convictions obtained without counsel.18D In both 
instances, defendants are deprived of rights guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment. 181 
172. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1743 (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 
447 (1972». . 
173. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1743 (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 116 
(1967» (quotation omitted). 
174. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent de-
fendants in state court criminal trials must have counsel appointed for them). 
175. Custis, 114 S. Ct. 1743. 
176. 1d. (quoting Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114) (quotation omitted). 
177. 1d. at 1744. 
178. See supra note 110, in which the language of the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution is reproduced. 
179. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1744 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970» 
(quotation omitted). 
180. See W. 
181. 1d. (comparing the right to be represented by counsel to the Sixth Amend-
ment rights to a jury trial and to confront adverse witnesses; both of which are 
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3. Statutory Interpretation 
The dissent also criticized the majority's conclusion that 
the absence of express statutory language permitting collateral 
attacks was an intentional omission.182 The dissent cautioned 
that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius183 is a 
flawed assumption when applied to the interpretation of stat-
utes and that all legislative omissions are not necessarily de-
liberate. l84 The dissent further questioned the majority's logic 
by pointing out that Congress was equally capable of expressly 
precluding collateral attacks, yet chose to omit that language 
from the statute as well. 185 
4. Ease of Administration 
Finally, the dissent questioned the "ease of administra-
tion" that the majority contended would result from disallow-
ing collateral attacks.186 The dissent argued that collateral 
attacks on prior convictions used to enhance sentences under 
the ACCA have been taking place in federal courts for nearly a 
decade,187 and at no time has any action been taken to relieve 
the judicial burden anticipated by the majority.188 The dis-
sent also pointed out that the burden of locating the necessary 
state court records, which the majority feared may be difficult 
to obtain, will fall on the defendant rather than the sentencing 
court. 189 Lastly, the dissent contended that collateral attacks 
182. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1741 (1994). 
183. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: "The expression of one thing - is 
the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). 
184. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1741 (citing Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 813 (1983); and Radin, 
Statutory Interpretation, 43 MARv. L. REv. 863, 873·74 (1930». Both articles cau· 
tioned that the legislature is not omniscient, and therefore, it is unwise to assume 
that all omissions are deliberate. 
185. Id. at 1742. 
186. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1746 (1994). 
187. Id. at 1746, 1740 n.2; see also supra notes 75 & 76 and accompanying 
text, wherein several appellate cases are listed in which collateral attacks were 
allowed. The earliest of those cases was United States v. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 
914-15 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the Ninth Circuit allowed a collateral challenge to 
a conviction enhanced under 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor of section 
924(e). See supra notes 36-59 and accompanying text. 
188. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1746. 
189. Id. ("[N]o one disagrees that the burden of showing the invalidity of prior 
22
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during sentencing may in fact increase judicial efficiency.19o 
Because the option of federal habeas review is open to a defen-
dant seeking to challenge a prior conviction,191 allowing that 
challenge to be heard at the time of sentencing would elimi-
nate the need to evaluate a habeas review at a later date in 
another proceeding.192 
VI. CRITIQUE 
As the dissent persuasively argued, the absence of an 
express provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act allowing 
collateral attacks to prior sentences is far from an express 
prohibition of collateral attacks.193 If an inference regarding 
legislative intent is to be drawn from a blank slate, the more 
compelling conclusion is that reached by the dissent: Congress 
did not intend to foreclose collateral review of convictions used 
to enhance sentences under the ACCA. 194 Congress failed to 
amend the ACCA, despite the fact that courts in at least eight 
circuits have interpreted it as allowing collateral attacks based 
on a variety of constitutional infirmities.195 This fact strongly 
supports the dissent's conclusion that Congressional intent was 
not misinterpreted by the appellate courts which allowed col-
lateral review. 196 
Also tenuous is the majority's distinction between a defen-
dant deprived of counsel and a defendant who suffered ineffec-
tive assistance counsel. 197 The Court has long recognized the 
constitutional requirement198 that defendants have the assis-· 
convictions would rest on the defendants."). 
190. [d. at 1746·47. 
191. Habeas review will remain open to the defendant as long as he remains in 
custody for that conviction. See supra notes 127 & 128. 
192. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1746·47. 
193. See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1741·42 (1994). 
194. See W. 
195. See id. at 1739·40 ("Courts of Appeals . . . (with the one exception of the 
court below) have understood "convictio[nl" in the ACCA to mean "lawful convic· 
tion," and have permitted defendants to show at sentencing that a prior conviction 
offered for enhancement was unconstitutionally obtained .... "). 
196. See id. 
197. See id. at 1737·38. 
198. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). 
23
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tance of counsel.199 In Strickland v. Washington, the Court 
further defined the protection mandated by the Constitution to 
include the assistance of effective counse1.200 The Court de-
clared in Strickland, "[t]hat a person who happens to be a 
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is 
not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.,,201 In 
Custis, however, the Court prohibited a defendant from show-
ing that ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced a convic-
tion,202 despite the fact that the prejudiced conviction would 
be used to dramatically increase the defendant's prison sen-
tence.203 Reconciling Custis with Strickland is difficult: 
Strickland would make void a conviction obtained without 
effective assistance of counsel, but Custis would allow that 
same unappealed conviction to be used against a defendant for 
sentencing purposes. 
The Custis prohibition against collateral challenges yields 
similar anomalous results when applied to other constitutional 
violations. For instance, Boykin v. Alabama204 held that it 
was plain error to accept an involuntary or uninformed guilty 
plea and a conviction resulting from such a plea was void.205 
Yet, despite the Court's recognition that such a plea renders 
the resulting conviction unreliable, it authorizes the use of 
such convictions to increase prison sentences under the 
ACCA.206 Convictions obtained under any of these circum-
stances are flawed and potentially erroneous, and as such, they 
should not be used to increase prison terms for subsequent 
convictions. 
199. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 468 (1938) (Sixth Amendment entitles 
criminal defendants to assistance of counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) (fundamental right to assistance of counsel applicable to state courts by 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
200. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
201. [d. at 686. 
202. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738. 
203. Custis was sentenced under the ACCA to nearly twenty years; absent the 
application of the ACCA sentence enhancement provisions, his sentence would have 
been approximately three years. See supra note 36. 
204. 396 U.S. 238 (1969). 
206. [d. at 242 (trial judge erred when he accepted Boykin's guilty plea without 
ascertaining whether it was voluntary and informed; the Court reversed Boykin's 
conviction). 
206. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738·39. 
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Why then, does the Court permit potentially flawed convic-
tions to be used against defendants for sentencing purposes? 
The answer appears to lie with the Court's concern with ease 
of administration and finality of judgments. 
The chief distinction between reviewable and non-review-
able constitutional claims appears to be their relative "ease of 
administration." If the flaw rendering a prior conviction inval-
id is readily apparent from the transcript of the rendering 
court, as would be the absence of counsel, the majority is will-
ing to allow that defect to be challenged during sentencing.207 
However, if the sentencing court is required to assess the mer-
its of a less obvious violation, the Court appears willing to 
forego constitutional protection.208 Presumably, this concern 
with ease of administration stems from increasingly overcrowd-
ed court dockets.209 
The majority also cited finality of judgments as a major 
policy reason supporting its decision.210 However, even if en-
suring the finality of judgments is sufficiently important to 
warrant denying defendants the right to challenge some consti-
tutionally infirm prior convictions, the Custis decision is un-
likely to achieve that goal. 211 Many defendants do not cur-
rently appeal their convictions because they may be nearing 
release or may be unable to afford the cost of an appeal.212 
However, when the consequence of an unappealed prior uncon-
stitutional conviction may be life imprisonment through sen-
tence enhancement, defendants are likely to pursue every 
available form of post-conviction review.21S ''Thus, in the in-
terest of finality, the government's position will create an in-
207. See id. 
208. See id. 
209. For an in-depth analysis of the impact of the increasing federal caseload, 
see Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and .PerceilJed "Bureaucracy" of the 
Federal Courts: A Causation· Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Reme· 
dies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871 (1983). 
210. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739. 
211. See David Cole, Criminals Called Out Before Finishing Their Chance At 
Bat, CONN. L. THIB., Mar. 28, 1994, at 18. Mr. Cole's article focuses on the effect 
the then-impending Supreme Court opinion in Custis would have on the general 
type of legislation referred to as "three strikes" laws. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. 
25
Strike: Mandatory Sentencing
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
292 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:267 
centive for an unending stream of post-conviction proceedings 
that would otherwise never occur."214 
The limits the Court placed on collateral review of prior 
convictions in Custis are analogous to the steps the Court has 
taken over the past several years to curtail access to habeas 
corpus review:215 
Over the past fifteen years, virtually every Term 
of the Supreme Court has brought new and 
substantial limits on the availability of federal 
habeas corpus. On the procedural side, the Court 
has foreclosed relief, with narrow exceptions, to 
state prisoners who have failed to preserve their 
claims in state court, lost on the merits of their 
claims in prior federal petitions, or failed to 
raise issues that could have been raised in prior 
filings. On the substantive side, the Court has 
withdrawn habeas review of Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary-rule claims that have been (or 
could have been) fully litigated in state court 
and sharply limited the retroactive application 
of "new" constitutional decisions.218 
In 1989, in Teague v. Lane,217 the Court so limited access 
to habeas review that some commentators believed the decision 
"sounded the death knell of habeas corpus as a vehicle for the 
protection of defendants' rights.,,218 The Court held in a plu-
rality opinion that "new rules,,219 would not be applicable to 
cases pending on habeas corpus review unless those rules fit 
214. Id. 
215. See generally Jordan Streiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 303 (1993) (providing a comprehensive overview of the transition that habeas 
corpus has undergone in the United States). 
216. Id. at 303·04 (footnotes omitted). 
217. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Teague Court held that new 
rules could not be applied retroactively to benefit petitioners seeking habeas reo 
view. Id. at 305·10. Thus, petitioners were precluded from benefiting from new 
rules that would have changed the results of the petitioners' trials, had the new 
rules been in effect at the time the petitioner was tried. Id. at 311·15. 
218. See Marc A. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal 
Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991). The Arkin article thor· 
oughly explores the restrictive effects Teague has had on habeas review. 
219. Justice O'Connor explained that "a case defines a new rule if the result 
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction be· 
came final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
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into two narrow exceptions.22o Some of the critics of the 
Court's decision in Teague concluded that the Court was plac-
ing its concern with the finality of judgments above its concern 
for constitutional protection of criminal defendants: "While the 
interests of finality are all well and good, it is a troubling rule 
indeed which permits one person to be executed and another to 
stay alive simply because of the date on which a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is denied."221 
Another author concluded that "[b]y placing too high a value 
on the finality of state court convictions, the Court has forgot-
ten what had once been the central issue of federal habeas 
corpus - whether or not a prisoner's conviction is constitution-
al."222 
The steps the Court has taken to mInImIZe the role of 
habeas review are tailored to significantly reduce the avenues 
of post-conviction relief available to criminal defendants.223 
Similarly, the Court is attempting in the Custis decision to 
achieve finality in judgments by restricting the challenges that 
a defendant may bring against prior convictions in a collateral 
forum. The same criticisms made against the reduced avail-
ability of habeas review are valid criticisms of the Custis deci-
sion - the Court is striving to solve logistical problems at the 
expense of constitutional protection. 
If, in fact, the Court is attempting to curtail opportunities 
220. [d. at 305·10. The first exception was for rules that "place, as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" (quoting jus-
tice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). The second 
exception applied only to new procedural rules that were "implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty" (quoting Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325 (1937». Unless a new rule of criminal procedure fit into one of those two 
exceptions, the rule would not be applied retroactively to benefit a prisoner seek-
ing habeas review. 
221. Arkin, supra note 218, at 418. 
222. Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus - Retroactivity of Post Conviction Rulings: 
Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 975 (1990) (ex-
ploring the effect that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), has had on subse-
quent cases). 
223. See, e.g., Eliot F. Krieger, Recent Development: The Court Declines in Fair· 
ness - Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 164, 
182 (1990) ("The Teague bar may effectively slam the door on most Federal review 
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for post-conviction relief for criminal defendants that it per-
ceives as excessive, it should address that issue more candidly 
than it did in Custis. While the majority opinion mentions 
briefly the issues of finality of judgments and ease of adminis-
tration, it does not identify these issues as primary concerns. 
Instead the Court shrouds its holding in a lengthy discussion 
of legislative intent and statutory interpretation of the ACCA. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
By interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act in the 
restrictive manner that it has, the Supreme Court has virtual-
ly guaranteed that some defendants' sentences will be in-
creased based on prior unconstitutional convictions. The Su-
preme Court has interpreted the United States Constitution as 
prohibiting convictions which result from ineffective coun-
sel224 or from unknowing or involuntary guilty pleas.226 Yet, 
the Court is quite willing to allow prison sentences to be in-
creased based on convictions marred by those errors. 
Despite the Court's asserted interpretation of the ACCA, 
its purpose in Custis is not effecting the mandate of the legis-
lature; its true policy is one of expedience. Just as availability 
of habeas review has been significantly limited in recent 
years,226 the Court is attempting in Custis to curtail what it 
perceives as excessive opportunity for judicial delay through 
collateral challenges to prior convictions. 
By precluding collateral challenges to prior convictions, the 
Court effectively declares that significant constitutional protec-
tion is unavailable in the sentencing forum. If the Court in-
tends to limit the protection guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution in the pursuit of expediency, it should at the very 
least achieve that result. The Custis decision appears more 
likely to result in a greater number of appeals and fewer guilty 
224. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
225. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
226. See generally Streiker, supra note 215. 
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pleas, thus exacerbating the very problem the Court sought to 
remedy. 
Barry W. Strike· 
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